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This Article addresses the role of stigma in procedural due process claims brought by prisoners.  In 
particular, the Article focuses on inmates whom prisons have classified as sexual offenders 
although they have never been convicted of a sex offense.  Prisons label these inmates—identified 
here as the “branded class”—as sexual offenders based on information outside of the inmates’ 
conviction histories, including charges that ended in dismissal or acquittal.  As a result of the sex 
offender classification, prisons impose upon the branded class a wide range of sex offender-specific 
conditions, including mandatory treatment and sex offender registration. 
In addressing procedural due process claims raised by members of the branded class, courts must 
decide whether either the stigma of the sex offender label or the conditions imposed on the inmate 
(or both) trigger a liberty interest requiring procedural due process protections.  In so doing, courts 
apply either the “stigma plus” test of Paul v. Davis or one of the two liberty interest tests articulated 
in Sandin v. Conner—what this Article terms the “atypical and significant” or “exceeds the 
sentence” standards. 
Paul sharply limited the circumstances in which stigma can implicate a liberty interest.  This 
Article explains why the liberty interest analysis articulated in Sandin—when informed by the 
stigma-focused holding of Vitek v. Jones—provides a greater opportunity for courts to treat 
stigma as a deciding factor in determining whether prison classification decisions implicate a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.  Further, the Article contends that courts should treat 
stigma as a significant factor when making such determinations.   
Towards this end, this Article posits a definition of “stigma” that incorporates and expands on the 
notion of stigma found in existing cases.  Specifically, it suggests that courts should always find 
that stigma is present when a prison imposes a label on an inmate that:  (a) implies that he has 
committed a criminal act or has a mental disorder; (b) is unrelated to the elements of his crimes of 
conviction; and (c) carries a significant risk of adverse consequences to the inmate.  In addition to 
adding clarity and consistency to the Sandin-based procedural due process analysis, this 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a very real sense, a prisoner’s experience in the U.S. prison system is 
defined by who the prison says he is.1  Once a person is incarcerated, the 
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 1 See Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 353 (2009) (“Prison 
and jail policies affect almost every area of prisoners’ lives.  Classification, disciplinary, 
and grievance policies all have a tremendous impact on how prisoners serve their 
sentence and what recourse they have to courts and other authorities.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
Apr. 2013] RIGHTS OF THE STIGMATIZED PRISONER 1057 
 
prison assigns him2 a security classification based on a prison official’s 
assessment of the inmate’s history of escape, tendencies towards violence, 
level of sexual deviancy, and a host of other factors not necessarily related to 
the crime for which he is serving his sentence.3  This classification level 
defines the prisoner’s world in almost every conceivable way—from the level 
of security to which he is subjected to the types of prison programs in which 
he is permitted, or required, to participate.4 
This Article focuses on a particular type of classification:  the practice of 
labeling an inmate as a sex offender despite the fact that he has never been 
convicted of a sexual offense or been accused of sexual misconduct within 
the prison.  Once the prisoner is thus classified, he is treated by the prison, 
and on parole, as a sex offender.5  For ease of reference, such inmates—
 
 2 While both male and female prisoners may be affected by the policies described in this 
Article, this Article primarily addresses a class of prisoners that is overwhelmingly male; 
reflecting this fact, and for simplicity’s sake, masculine pronouns will be used in this 
Article to refer to inmates in general. 
 3 See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION 
AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION ch. 4, at 6–13 (2006) [hereinafter INMATE SECURITY 
DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION] (providing that the prison determines the 
federal inmate’s security level using factors including length of sentence, severity of 
current offense, criminal history score, history of violence, history of escape or attempts, 
type of detainer, age, educational level, and drug or alcohol abuse; the prison also 
considers a host of “public safety factors,” including a male inmate’s involvement in a 
“disruptive group,” the inmate’s greatest severity offense, whether the prisoner is a sex 
offender, was involved in a serious escape, a prison disturbance, or committed “serious 
telephone abuse,” among other factors). 
 4 Lawrence L. Bench & Terry D. Allen, Investigating the Stigma of Prison Classification:  An 
Experimental Design, 83 PRISON J. 367, 367 (2003) (noting that the “consequences of the 
classification decision have far-reaching implications for the lives of offenders, including 
mental health services, substance abuse counseling, program needs, and vocational 
training”). 
 5 At times, a “sex offender” classification imposed by a prison on an inmate follows that 
inmate into parole.  See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 2004).  
In Gwinn, Mr. Gwinn was originally charged with robbery, aggravated robbery, and sexual 
assault, but pled guilty only to robbery.  Id.  Based on the dismissed sexual assault charge, 
the prison required him to participate in sex offender treatment while incarcerated.  Mr. 
Gwinn was granted parole on the condition that he register as a sex offender and 
participate in sex offender treatment.  Id.  See also Jones v. Lane, No. 
CIVA06CV00116EWNMEH, 2006 WL 4451913, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Oct. 4, 2006), where Mr. 
Jones was serving a prison sentence for a drug-related offense when the Colorado 
Department of Corrections classified him as a sex offender based on a sex offense charge 
that had been dismissed by the prosecution nine years earlier.  When released on parole, 
Mr. Jones’ parole officer required him to take part in sex offender treatment as a 
condition of parole; when he refused to do so, the Colorado Parole Board revoked his 
parole.  Id.  At other times, it is a parole officer who labels a parolee as a “sex offender,” 
despite the fact that he had not been so classified while in prison.  Courts have not always 
distinguished between the source of the sex offender label—a prison official or a parole 
officer—when evaluating procedural due process claims brought by members of the 
branded class.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 2004) 
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those who prisons classify as sexual offenders although they have never 
incurred a sexual offense conviction—will be referred to here as the 
“branded class.”  This practice affects a significant number of inmates:  one 
state prison system classified approximately 11% of its total male prison 
population as sexual offenders, or eligible to be classified as sexual 
offenders, despite having never been convicted of a sex offense.6  Another 
estimate indicates that almost 7000 inmates were eligible for inclusion in the 
branded class.7  This is so because federal and state prison classification 
procedures require that prison officials classify inmates as sex offenders 
based on information that extends beyond their criminal records.8  As a 
result, prison officials often make individual determinations of an inmate’s 
 
(applying both Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 
(1980), cases addressing procedural due process rights in prison, to a procedural due 
process claim stemming from a parole panel’s imposition of sex offender registration and 
therapy conditions on a parolee with no sex offense convictions; noting that “as in the 
prison context, a condition may present such a ‘dramatic departure from the basic 
conditions’ of a parolee’s sentence that the state must provide some procedural 
protections prior to its imposition” (footnote omitted)); Williams v. Ballard, No. 3-02-CV-
0270-M, 2004 WL 1499457, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2004) (applying an amalgam of 
the Paul “stigma plus” test and the Sandin liberty interest standards to the imposed parole 
conditions). 
 6 According to a statistical report by the Colorado Department of Corrections, out of a total 
of 20,569 male inmates, the Department of Corrections had classified 1234 male inmates 
as “S4”—Administratively Determined Sex Offender—meaning that the prisoners at issue 
had never been convicted of a sexual offense, but the prison found them to be sex 
offenders through “sexual violence needs classification review procedures” within the 
prison.  Another 1028 male inmates were classified as “S2,” meaning that they had not 
been convicted of a sexual crime but rather had an “[i]ndication of sexually abusive 
behavior that has not been determined to be a sex offense through a due process 
procedure.”  In total, then, 2262 male inmates in the Colorado system were either 
classified as sexual offenders, or eligible to be classified as sexual offenders, despite 
having never been convicted of a sex offense.  In contrast, 3908 male inmates were 
classified as “S5,” meaning that they either had been convicted or adjudicated as a sex 
offender, or the “court made a finding of sexual factual basis or registration as a sex 
offender.”  BONNIE L. BARR, CHICK R. GILBERT & MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE, STATISTICAL 
REPORT:  FISCAL YEAR 2010, COLO. DEP’T OF CORR. 22, 37 (2011), available at 
http://www.doc.state.co.us/sites/default/files/opa/StatRprt_FY10_0.pdf) (compiling 
statistical data which is analyzed in this footnote); COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE NEEDS CLASSIFICATION, ADMIN. REG. 750-02, at 1–3 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.doc.state.co.us/sites/default/files/ar/0750_02_110111.pdf [hereinafter 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE NEEDS CLASSIFICATION] (outlining definitions of S1–5 designations). 
 7 Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2010), clarified on denial of reh’g, Meza v. 
Livingston, No. 09-50367, 2010 WL 6511727 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Moreover, at trial, an 
Administrator for the [Texas Parole] Board testified that as many as 6,900 current 
inmates are subject to have sex offender conditions, including sex offender registration, 
imposed upon them in the future, despite the fact that they have not been convicted of a 
sex crime.”).  The quote at issue stems from trial testimony that appears to have taken 
place around 2005. 
 8 See, e.g., SEXUAL VIOLENCE NEEDS CLASSIFICATION, supra note 6, at 1–3. 
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level of sexual deviancy based on data derived from a wide range of extra-
judicial sources unrelated to his conviction history. 
A sex offender classification is a severely demeaning label9 which results 
in a wide variety of institutional consequences, including sex offender 
registration and sex offender treatment, for inmates in the branded class.  
While these prisoners have protested their classification and treatment as 
sexual offenders on a variety of constitutional bases—from ex post facto,10 to 
Eighth Amendment,11 to equal protection claims12—it is only through 
procedural due process challenges that these inmates have found any 
measure of relief.  In adjudicating procedural due process claims raised by 
members of the branded class, courts must decide whether either the stigma 
of the sex offender label or the conditions imposed on the inmate (or both) 
trigger a liberty interest requiring procedural protections under the Due 
Process Clause. 
In making such determinations, courts rely on either the “stigma plus” 
test set forth in Paul v. Davis,13 or one of the two liberty interest tests 
articulated by Sandin v. Conner—the “atypical and significant” standard or 
the “exceeds the sentence” standard.14  Paul centers its liberty interest 
standard on stigma, but it severely limited the importance of stigma in 
procedural due process claims by holding that individuals have no liberty 
interest in avoiding a government-imposed stigmatizing label.15  Sandin has 
 
 9 See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions:  Are There Any Limits?, 34 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 17 (2008) (describing how “American 
society has decided that there is no greater villain than the sex offender.  Terrorists, drug 
dealers, murderers, kidnappers, mobsters, gangsters, drunk drivers, and white-collar 
criminals do not elicit the emotions and evoke the political response that sex offenders 
do”—nor have they prompted the variety and breadth of legislative measures to which 
sexual offenders are subjected); see also W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal 
Procedure:  In Re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 
176 (2011) (“[F]ew would disagree that no matter how one describes stigma, sex 
offenders are stigmatized:  they commit as close to a permanent and unforgiveable 
offense as we have today.” (footnote omitted)).  The consequences of a sex offender 
conviction or label, both institutional and social, are discussed in this Article.  See infra 
Part I. 
 10 See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 11 See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2004); Tinsley v. Goord, 
No. 05-Civ. 3921, 2006 WL 2707324, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006). 
 12 See, e.g., Awmiller, 354 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 13 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976). 
 14 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 
 15 Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12 (“It was this alteration, officially removing the interest from the 
recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which we found sufficient to 
invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . . [T]he interest in reputation alone which the respondent seeks to 
vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ 
recognized in [prior] decisions . . . . For these reasons we hold that the interest in 
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no overt focus on stigma, but concentrates instead on whether prison 
conditions “exceed the [inmate’s] sentence” or are “atypical and significant” 
without providing clear guidelines to assist courts in making either 
determination.16  This Article attempts to explain why, despite the 
limitations that Paul places on stigma-centered procedural due process 
claims, the liberty interest analysis articulated in Sandin v. Conner—informed 
by the stigma-focused analysis of Vitek v. Jones—provides an opportunity for 
courts to treat stigma as a deciding factor in determining whether prison 
classification decisions implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause. 
Further, this Article contends that courts should treat stigma as a 
significant factor when deciding whether a condition imposed by prisons on 
inmates triggers a liberty interest deserving of procedural protections.  This 
is not to say that stigma must be present in order for a liberty interest to 
exist—prison conditions can certainly implicate liberty interests even if they 
are not stigmatizing, and there is no need to add an additional requirement 
when prisoners are raising condition-focused procedural due process claims.  
However, when stigma is considered as a source of liberty interests, prisoners 
in the branded class may benefit from expanded procedural due process 
protections.  And, while a prison’s interest in labeling and treating inmates 
as sex offenders based on information other than their conviction history is 
understandable, and perhaps even desirable in some cases, this Article 
proceeds from the position that meaningful procedural protections will 
better ensure that the inmates thus labeled are deserving of both the stigma 
and the consequences imposed.17 
This Article is the first to address the role that stigma can play in liberty 
interest determinations behind prison walls under Sandin v. Conner.  In so 
doing, it builds upon prior research addressing the role of stigma in liberty 
interest claims in general,18 and synthesizes that literature with the literature 
 
reputation asserted in this case is neither ‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state 
deprivation without due process of law.”). 
 16 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483–84 (“[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances 
create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.  But these interests 
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the 
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process 
Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 17 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 9, at 151 (“The difference between stereotyping and risk 
assessment has to do with the quality of deliberation—ensuring that the stigma that 
attaches itself to the term ‘sex offender’ matches up to an individual’s risk.  This is 
precisely what due process protections are designed to ensure.”). 
 18 See, e.g., id. at 119 (arguing that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), should apply 
to all cases, whether civil or criminal, that involve the imposition of stigma and the 
deprivation of liberty); Marissa Ceglian, Predators or Prey:  Mandatory Listing of Non-Predatory 
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discussing the challenges of procedural due process considerations in 
prisoner-brought cases.19  Towards this end, this Article adopts a definition 
of “stigma” in the context of prison classifications that incorporates and 
expands upon the notion of stigma found in existing cases.  Specifically, the 
Article argues that courts should always find that stigma is present when a 
prison imposes a label on an inmate that:  (a) implies that he has committed 
a criminal act or has a mental disorder; (b) is unrelated to the elements of 
his crimes of conviction; and (c) carries a significant risk of adverse 
consequences to the inmate.  When such stigma exists, courts should 
consistently find that the inmate at issue has a liberty interest in avoiding the 
stigmatizing label and its attendant conditions that requires procedural due 
process protections.  This definition of “stigma” would facilitate more robust 
procedural due process protections and more consistent application of 
 
Offenders on Predatory Offender Registries, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 843, 844–45 (2003) (discussing 
procedural and substantive due process challenges to Minnesota’s sex offender 
registration statute, which required persons who had not been convicted of sexual 
offenses to register as sex offenders if their convictions arose “out of the same set of 
circumstances” as a sexual crime enumerated in the statute); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural 
Due Process and Reputational Harm:  Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 79 
(2009) (arguing that the Paul “stigma plus” standard should be revisited to allow 
reputational harm, alone, to serve as a liberty interest deserving of procedural due 
process protections, both because reputation should be “conceptualized as a critical site 
for autonomous identity formation,” and because of the serious labels the government is 
now imposing on its citizens); Ofer Raban, Be They Fish or Not Fish:  The Fishy Registration of 
Nonsexual Offenders, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 511 (2007) (arguing that when 
persons who have been convicted of nonsexual crimes are required to register as sex 
offenders, this act violates the “fundamental right . . . not to be publicly identified by the 
government as something that they are not—namely, sex offenders,” in violation of their 
substantive due process rights). 
 19 See, e.g., Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality:  Examining the Procedural Due Process 
Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 785 (2004) (arguing that 
courts should examine the typicality of prison conditions under Sandin v. Conner by 
applying a balancing test that “weighs typicality based on actual state practices, 
significance as a de minimis threshold, and state positive law as an evidentiary tool in 
determining whether a liberty interest is at stake”); Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate 
Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based Upon Alleged Gang Affiliations:  A Reexamination of 
Procedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 
1115, 1120 (1995) (arguing that inmates should only be segregated if they have broken 
prison rules, not based on the gang affiliation alone); Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An 
Atypical and Significant Hardship”:  The Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based 
Purely on Status—A Plea for Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2004) 
(describing the basis for a liberty interest requiring procedural due process protections in 
avoiding Supermax confinement for death row prisoners); Andrew J. Theis, Note, The 
Gang’s All Here:  How the Supreme Court’s Unanimous Holding in Wilkinson v. Austin Utilizes 
Supermax Facilities to Combat Prison Gangs and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 
145, 149 (2006) (contending that prisons should not be burdened with additional 
procedural due process requirements in prison transfer cases, as prisons require 
flexibility in administrative segregation decisions in order to combat prison gangs). 
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those protections when prisons wish to classify inmates in a deeply 
stigmatizing manner. 
Part II of this Article addresses how inmates become part of the branded 
class and describes the consequences that unfold once a member of the 
branded class is classified as a sexual offender.  Part III discusses the role of 
stigma in cases applying the liberty interest standards of Paul and Sandin to 
members of the branded class.  This Part also addresses the ways in which 
Sandin provides a greater opportunity for courts, when considering 
procedural due process claims raised by members of the branded class, to 
consider stigma as a meaningful part of a liberty interest analysis.  Part IV 
suggests a definition of “stigma” that would add consistency and clarity to 
Sandin-based procedural due process claims based on prison classification 
decisions.  Part V discusses what process is sufficient to protect the liberty 
interests of members of the branded class.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE BRANDED CLASS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CLASS MEMBERSHIP 
There are multiple routes by which inmates find themselves within the 
branded class.  Prisons have classified prisoners as sexual offenders in cases 
when the inmate was once arrested or charged with a sexual offense, only to 
have the case dismissed;20 or was originally charged with a sexual crime, but 
pled guilty to a non-sexual offense;21 or, in the prison’s view, the underlying 
 
 20 See, e.g., Chambers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1238 (10th Cir. 2000) (inmate 
classified as an S-2 sex offender, meaning one who had “committed a sex offense but was 
not convicted of a sex offense charge,” based on case that had been dismissed); Kirby v. 
Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (inmate classified as sex offender based 
on a prior sex offense charge that was “no billed” by a grand jury, and another prior 
sexual assault charge that was nolle prossed in the trial court); Perales v. Hickman, No. 
CIV S-06-0358, 2007 WL 2225793, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2007) (inmate classified as sex 
offender and denied visitation with grandchildren based on a prior sexual assault charge 
that had been dismissed); Brack v. Ortiz, No. 05-cv-02658, 2007 WL 867992, at *3 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 20, 2007) (inmate classified as sex offender and given sex offender-specific 
conditions of parole based on two prior arrests for sexual crimes as well as the results of a 
polygraph test); Wisconsin ex rel Matlouck v. Hepp, No. 2006AP445, 2006 WL 2772684, at 
*1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2006) (inmate classified as sex offender and ordered to 
participate in sex offender treatment based on a prior sexual assault charge that had 
been dismissed). 
 21 See, e.g., Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2006) (inmate classified as sex 
offender based on a sexual assault charge that was dismissed in exchange for a plea of 
guilty to aggravated assault); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(inmate required to register as sex offender and complete sex offender therapy based on 
a charge of aggravated sexual assault of a child and a charge of indecency with a child by 
contact, both of which were dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to simple assault); 
Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (inmate required to complete 
sex offender treatment based on sexual assault charge that was dismissed in exchange for 
a plea of guilty to robbery); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641–42 (8th Cir. 2003) 
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facts of an entirely non-sexual conviction included a “sexual component.”22  
Indeed, prisons have classified some incarcerated people as sexual offenders 
based on sexual charges for which they were acquitted.23  These 
classifications may be security measures, but they cannot be disciplinary 
ones:  the prisoners in the branded class (as defined here24) have not been 
accused of sexual wrongdoing while in the correctional facility.  Rather, the 
prisons’ decision to label and treat inmates in the branded class as sexual 
offenders is based on inferences drawn from evidence outside the 
correctional institution, such as police reports, sentencing documents, or 
other records that may indicate to prison officials that the prisoner escaped 
a conviction for sexual assault through, for example, a savvy plea bargain or 
poor prosecutorial charging decisions.  Such external evidence can be quite 
compelling,25 although at other times the prisons’ justifications for their 
decisions in these cases are less persuasive.26 
 
(inmate required to register as sex offender based on a sexual assault charge that was 
dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to third degree assault); Talouzi v. O’Brien, No. 
Civ.A. 05-CV-235-HRW, 2006 WL 625292, *1–2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 10, 2006) (inmate classified 
as sex offender based on two counts of first degree sexual abuse, both of which were 
dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to two misdemeanor counts of battery); Jones v. 
Puckett, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (inmate required to complete sex 
offender treatment based on a sex offense charge that was dismissed in exchange for a 
plea of guilty to attempted murder and kidnapping). 
 22 See, e.g., Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (inmate convicted of 
murder required to complete sex offender treatment because the crime included “a 
sexual component”). 
 23 See, e.g., Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (inmate classified as sex offender 
based on a sexual assault charge for which he was acquitted at trial); Tinsley v. Goord, No. 
05 Civ. 3921, 2006 WL 2707324, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006) (inmate required to 
participate in sex offender treatment based on a sexual assault charge for which he was 
acquitted at trial); Thomas v. Warden, 891 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(inmate classified as sex offender based on a sexual assault charge for which he was 
acquitted at trial). 
 24 Certainly inmates do commit sexual offenses in prison, with attendant consequences and 
procedural due process implications, but those inmates and their claims are not included 
in the branded class.  As defined in this Article, the branded class is composed of inmates 
who have not been convicted of sexual offenses nor accused of sexual misconduct within 
the correctional facility. 
 25 The facts underlying some of these cases, while not proven in court, are disturbing and 
raise understandable and serious questions about the sexual treatment needs of the 
inmates at issue.  A grisly example is the case of Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 444 (7th 
Cir. 2006), in which Richard Grennier was charged with and convicted of first degree 
murder, but the prison’s review of the police reports in the case revealed evidence that 
the victim’s corpse had been sexually assaulted.  Similarly, in Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 
392 (5th Cir. 2010), Raul Meza pled guilty to murdering a nine-year-old girl.  Although 
Meza was charged with and convicted of murder alone, evidence in that case indicated 
that the child had been raped before she was killed. 
 26 In Garcia v. Henry, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence that an inmate had 
previously been arrested and charged with sex crimes constituted sufficient evidence 
supporting his sex offender classification under “any possible burden of proof,” despite 
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Once inmates have been classified, prison and parole officials generally 
treat members of the branded class the same as prisoners convicted of sex 
crimes.  Prisons require such prisoners to participate in sex offender 
treatment, including individual and group therapy and polygraph and 
 
the fact that the inmate had not been convicted of the crimes at issue.  13 F. App’x 579, 
580–81 (9th Cir. 2001).  If, at times, prisons seem to be adopting a “better safe than sorry” 
attitude, they are in step with a variety of legislative efforts aimed at sex offenders, or 
persons suspected of being sex offenders.  This is a time in the United States in which 
antagonism towards sex offenders is particularly acute.  This enmity is reflected in a wide 
variety of laws aimed at sex offenders.  See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) 
(holding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act is not punishment); Seling v. Young, 
531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001) (holding that civil commitment statute aimed at “sexually 
violent predators” was civil, not criminal, and thus “cannot be deemed punitive ‘as 
applied’ to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto 
Clauses”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that Kansas’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Act, which allowed the state to subject to involuntary civil commitment 
those persons found likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence” because they 
suffered from a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder,” did not violate 
Hendricks’ substantive due process rights, nor did it constitute punishment).  For an 
overview of legislation aimed at sex offenders, see Wright, supra note 9, at 29–48 
(reviewing laws regarding sex offender registration, notification, GPS monitoring and 
tracking, civil commitment, residency restrictions, and chemical castration, including the 
federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act and the Adam Walsh Act, among others); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO 
EASY ANSWERS:  SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US (2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers (providing a 
comprehensive study of U.S. sex offender policies).  Many of these laws impose 
consequences on a broad group rather than determining if all members of the group 
deserve, or would benefit from, the condition at issue.  See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) (holding that a convicted sex offender did not have 
a right to a due process hearing to prove his “current dangerousness” before inclusion in 
Connecticut’s Sex Offender registry because that finding “is of no consequence” under 
Connecticut’s registration law, which was based on conviction for a sexual assault and 
nothing more).  But see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (holding that the state 
cannot civilly commit a sex offender without determining that it would be difficult for the 
offender to control his behavior).  Laws targeting sex offenders often include non-sexual 
offenses—such as public urination or kidnapping—in the list of sexual crimes to which 
the law applies.  See People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (N.Y. 2009) 
(“Defendants . . . committed, or attempted to commit, kidnapping and unlawful 
imprisonment.  Their victims were children, and defendants were not their victims’ 
parents.  We hold that the State did not violate defendants’ constitutional rights by 
compelling them to register as ‘sex offenders,’ even though there was no proof that their 
crimes involved any sexual act or sexual motive.”); Steven J. Costigliacci, Protecting Our 
Children From Sex Offenders:  Have We Gone Too Far?, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 180 (2008) 
(discussing the Adam Walsh Act’s inclusion of kidnapping and false imprisonment on the 
list of offenses requiring sex offender registration, without requiring that either crime 
have a sexual component); see also Marissa Ceglian, Note, Predators or Prey:  Mandatory 
Listing of Non-Predatory Offenders on Predatory Offender Registries, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 843, 846 
(2004) (arguing that persons, like Brian Gunderson in Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 
(8th Cir. 2003), who have not been convicted of sexual offenses are entitled to 
procedural due process protections before they are required to register as sex offenders). 
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plethysmograph testing.27  The prison may place restrictions on the inmate’s 
prison visitation, work, or other privileges.28  If an offender is released on 
parole, his parole officer may direct him to comply with sex offender-specific 
conditions, including sexual offender treatment, sex offender registration, 
restrictions on where and with whom the parolee may live, limitations on the 
use or ownership of computers with internet access, and prohibitions 
regarding possession of any sexually-oriented materials.29  Both in prison 
and on parole, the prisoner may be required to accept responsibility for the 
alleged behavior underlying his classification or face a variety of negative 
consequences, including being denied eligibility for parole or having his 
parole revoked altogether.30 
 
 27 A plethysmograph is a device that is placed around a man’s penis while he is shown a 
series of sexual images in order to monitor his erectile responses.  For a description of 
the plethysmograph, see Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and Perversity:  The Use of Penile 
Plethysmography on Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2004). 
 28 See, e.g., Perales v. Hickman, No. CIV S-06-0358, 2007 WL 2225793, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 
31, 2007) (describing an inmate who was denied visits with his grandchildren based on 
his sex offender classification). 
 29 See, e.g., Williams v. Ballard, No. 3-02-CV-0270-M, 2004 WL 1499457, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. 
June 18, 2004) (discussing Mr. Williams, who had never been convicted of a sexual 
offense, yet had the following prohibitions imposed upon him when he was released to 
mandatory supervision, based on a sexual assault charge that had been dismissed:  “1. 
Going in, on, or within 500 feet of premises where children commonly gather, including 
a school, day-care facility, playground, public or private youth center, public swimming 
pool, or video arcade facility; 2. Supervising or participating in any program that includes 
participant or recipient persons who are 17 years of age or younger and that regularly 
provides athletic, civic, or cultural activities; 3. Operating, causing to operate, securing 
employment in, participating in, or attending, going in, on, or within 500 feet of any 
sexually oriented business, including adult bookstores, massage parlors, adult video 
stores, or any business that provides adult entertainment, such as nude or partially-nude 
service, dancing, or exhibition; 4. Residing with, contacting, or causing to be contacted, 
any person 17 years of age or younger, in person, by telephone, correspondence, video or 
audio device, third person, media, or any electronic means, without the approval of his 
supervising parole officer; 5. Dating, marrying, or establishing a platonic relationship with 
any person 17 years of age or younger, or with any person who has children 17 years of 
age or younger, without the approval of his supervising parole officer; 6. Having any 
unsupervised contact with persons 17 years of age or younger; 7. Possessing, purchasing, 
or subscribing to any literature, magazines, books, or videotapes that depict sexually 
explicit images; 8. Communicating with a person for sexually explicit purposes through 
telecommunications or any other electronic means, including 1-900 services; 9. 
Subscribing to, operating, using, or communicating on or by computer or otherwise 
Internet services, fax services, or electronic bulletin boards; 10. Owning, maintaining, or 
operating computer equipment without a declared purpose and authorization from his 
supervising parole officer; and 11. owning, maintaining, or operating photographic 
equipment, to include instamatic, still photo, video, or any electronic imaging equip-
ment.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Jones v. Lane, No. CIVA06CV00116EWNMEH, 2006 WL 4451913, at *2 (D. Colo. 
Oct. 4, 2006) (alleging that the plaintiff was subjected to arrest and a parole revocation 
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Further, from the “sex offender” label unfold a wide variety of adverse 
consequences that are not necessarily prison-prescribed.  Sex offenders 
occupy the lowest rung in the prison hierarchy.31  As a result, inmates 
labeled as sex offenders are at heightened risk for violent, sometimes 
sexual,32 attacks within prison.  Outside of prison, individuals labeled as sex 
offenders often experience difficulty finding employment and housing, and 
may find themselves the targets of community outrage ranging from having 
their homes vandalized to suffering physical assaults.33  One study found 
that, in a state that broadcasts the names of all felony sex offenders on the 
internet and allows for other types of community notification, “one-third to 
one-half of sex offenders . . . reported ‘dire consequences’ such as the loss of 
 
hearing for failure to admit to being a sex offender, register as a sex offender, and 
undergo sex offender treatment).  
 31 See Charles Schwaebe, Learning to Pass:  Sex Offenders’ Strategies for Establishing a Viable 
Identity in the Prison General Population, 49(6) INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 614, 618 (2005) (discussing the results of a study of ten prisoners enrolled 
in a six-month sex offender treatment program in prison and finding that:  “All the men 
in this study recognized the basic fact that as sex offenders they were members of a highly 
stigmatized group and thus vulnerable to harassment and assault.  In addition, larger, 
stronger, or more aggressive inmates habitually preyed on the weaker, smaller, or less 
aggressive inmates as a matter of course.  Self-protection was best achieved by any 
combination of strategies, including the establishment of a reputation as one capable of 
self-defense, denial of status as a sex offender, involvement in a gang or other protective 
clique, and prudent choices regarding associates and disclosure of one’s offense.”). 
 32 See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 159–60 (2006) 
(noting that sex offenders are a “distinct and disfavored category within prison 
populations, subject to heightened abuse from both corrections officers and fellow 
inmates,” and may also be more likely to be sexually victimized themselves (citing Philip 
H. Witt & Natalie Barone, Assessing Sex Offender Risk:  New Jersey’s Methods, 16 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 170 (2004), and Marsha Weissman & Richard Luciani, Sentencing the Sex Offender: A 
Defense Perspective, in NAT’L CONFERENCE ON SENTENCING ADVOCACY, 150 LITIGATION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES:  CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 272–73 (1989), but also noting that one author, Daniel Lockwood, 
Issues in Prison Sexual Violence, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 97, 99 (Michael C. Braswell 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994), found no evidence that child sex offenders were “more likely to 
be raped in prison”)); see also NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 75 (2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (citing “prior convictions for sex offenses 
against an adult or child” in a list of factors that the report states prisons should use to 
identify inmates at heightened risk of being sexually victimized, along with “mental or 
physical disability, young age, slight build, first incarceration in prison or jail, nonviolent 
history, . . . sexual orientation of gay or bisexual, gender nonconformance (e.g., 
transgender or intersex identity), prior sexual victimization, and the inmate’s own 
perception of vulnerability”). 
 33 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 78–79 (“Registered sex offenders face 
ostracism, job loss, eviction or expulsion from their homes, and the dissolution of 
personal relationships.  They confront harassment, threats, and property damage.  Some 
have endured vigilantism and violence.  A few have been killed.  Many experience 
‘despair and hopelessness;’ some have committed suicide.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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a job or home, threats or harassment, or property damage,” while about 
16% reported being physically assaulted.34 
III.  LIBERTY INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE BRANDED CLASS 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments 
protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property.  A liberty 
interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by “reason of guarantees 
implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or it may arise from an expectation or interest 
created by state law or policies.35  While many of the rights and liberties one 
enjoys in free society are lost or significantly truncated upon conviction and 
incarceration, the Supreme Court has made clear “[t]here is no iron curtain 
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” and held 
that prisoners may claim the protections of the Due Process Clause, such 
that they may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law.36  Although the Supreme Court has held that a change in the 
conditions of prison confinement may have a “substantial adverse impact” 
on an inmate without invoking a liberty interest requiring procedural due 
process protections, a liberty interest may nevertheless exist when a 
particular label and condition exceeds “the normal limits or range of 
custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”37 
As with all procedural due process claims, courts determining whether 
prison inmates have suffered a violation of their procedural due process 
rights must decide, first, whether the state has interfered with an inmate’s 
protected liberty or property interest, and, if so, whether the procedural 
safeguards in place were constitutionally sufficient to protect the liberty 
interest at stake.38  In undertaking the first determination with regard to the 
 
 34 Id. at 79 (citing Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effects of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender 
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 1, 49–66 (2005), available at 
http://www.royallcreations.com/fatsa/Megans_Law_Impact_JCCJ.pdf (summarizing the 
inconclusive data on the effects of Megan’s Law)). 
 35 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 
 36 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
 37 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216–17, 224, 225 (1976) (addressing the re-classification 
of prisoners to a prison with “substantially less” favorable living conditions, based on 
allegations of misconduct within the prison, and holding that “the Due Process Clause in 
and of itself [does not] protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one 
institution to another within the state prison system . . . . That life in one prison is much 
more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution 
with the more severe rules.”); see also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 
2006) (stating that classifications decisions usually do not constitute a deprivation of a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, but a liberty interest may be at stake 
if prison conditions are atypical and significant). 
 38 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
1068 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
branded class, courts rely on the liberty interest tests articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis and Sandin v. Conner.  An analysis of the Paul 
and Sandin liberty interest tests in relation to members of the branded class 
illustrates the differences between these approaches and demonstrates the 
ways in which stigma may play a more robust role in liberty interest 
determinations under Sandin than under the overtly stigma-focused Paul. 
A. Paul v. Davis and the Branded Class 
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis addressed whether 
government-imposed stigma—in that case, listing Mr. Davis, who had been 
arrested for but not convicted of shoplifting, on a police-issued flyer entitled 
“Active Shoplifters”—implicated a liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause.39  Now known as the “stigma plus” standard, the holding in Paul 
established that government-imposed injury to reputation alone does not 
implicate a liberty interest requiring procedural due process protections.40  
While the Court did not define “stigma” in Paul, subsequent cases applying 
Paul have defined a stigmatizing label as one that “is sufficiently derogatory 
to injure [a person’s] reputation, that is capable of being proved false, and 
that he or she asserts is false.”41  Paul established that a liberty interest is at 
stake only if the stigmatizing label is accompanied by the government’s 
alteration or obliteration of “a right or status previously recognized by state 
law.”42  Under Paul, in other words, it is only this particular type of added 
burden that adds constitutional significance to what is otherwise (according 
to Paul) harmless government-imposed stigma. 
Prisoners in the branded class face considerable challenges in meeting 
the Paul standard, as courts have shown reluctance both in finding the sex 
offender label stigmatizing and in finding that the conditions imposed upon 
these prisoners altered or eliminated a state-recognized right.  In the first 
instance, courts have ruled that the label was not stigmatizing because either 
it was not made public43 or the prisoner did not affirmatively assert that the 
label was false.44  In Vega v. Lantz, for instance, the Second Circuit held that 
 
 39 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695–96, 709 (1976).  Like Mr. Paul, inmates in the branded 
class are given a label that implies that they have committed a criminal act for which they 
have not been convicted. 
 40 Id. at 712 (“[W]e hold that the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither 
‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 42 Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. 
 43 See, e.g., Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that Mr. 
Gunderson was not stigmatized by registering as a sex offender, as the information in the 
registry was “private” and was used only by law enforcement). 
 44 See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1225 
(arguing that government blacklists trigger a liberty interest under the constitutional 
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Mr. Vega, who was convicted of assault and kidnapping but acquitted of a 
sexual assault charge at trial, failed to establish that he was stigmatized by 
the prison’s sex offender classification because he did not deny that the 
conduct underlying the classification occurred,45 nor did he assert that the 
prison was “unreasonable” in classifying his assault conviction as a sexual 
offense.46 
Alternatively, courts applying Paul to liberty interests claims raised by 
members of the branded class may acknowledge the stigma of the sexual 
offender label but rule that the condition imposed by a prison as a result of 
the label did not satisfy the “plus” requirement of the “stigma plus” test.  For 
example, in Grennier v. Frank, Mr. Grennier, an inmate serving a life 
sentence for murder, complained that he was repeatedly denied parole 
because he had not successfully completed a sex offender treatment 
program the prison imposed upon him because of evidence that he had 
sexually assaulted his victim.47  Mr. Grennier did not have a liberty interest 
under Paul’s “stigma plus” standard, the Seventh Circuit held, because 
parole is discretionary for persons serving life sentences under Wisconsin 
law, and thus no state-established right had been altered or eliminated.48  
Similarly, in Gunderson v. Hvass, the Eighth Circuit held that a prisoner who 
had been originally charged with a sexual offense but pled guilty to a non-
sexual misdemeanor did not have a liberty interest in avoiding registration 
as a sexual offender, because the burden of sex offender registration was “a 
minimal one.”49 
 
guarantee against bills of attainder, and noting that “[c]ases rejecting a liberty interest 
[under Paul v. Davis] tend to take one of two forms.  Most will assume arguendo that a 
given label is stigmatizing, but resolve the case on lack of a plus.  Others will deny the 
presence of stigma because the allegedly derogatory statement was not published, or 
because it was not alleged to be false.” (footnotes omitted)).  Sometimes courts find that 
the plaintiff was not stigmatized because he had not been formally classified as a sex 
offender.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Nix, No. 1:05-CV-2349, 2007 WL 779067, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. 
Mar. 8, 2007) (holding that the fact that Mr. Mitchell was required to participate in sex 
offender treatment as a precondition to parole eligibility, based on the Parole Board’s 
belief that his murder conviction contained a sexual component, did not trigger due 
process protections under Paul because the prison never formally classified Mitchell as a 
sex offender). 
 45 Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the “conduct underlying his 
conviction for assault [was] the removal of a teenage girl’s nipple and . . . forcing her to 
swallow it”). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that registration required 
Mr. Gunderson to provide the state with his fingerprints, a photograph, and current 
information about his address, employment, and vehicle).  The court also held that Mr. 
Gunderson was not stigmatized by the registration, as the information was used only by 
law enforcement.  Id.; see also McCormick v. Hamrick, No. CIV-09-0054-HE, 2010 WL 
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B. Sandin v. Conner and the Branded Class 
While Paul has understandably played a role in courts’ consideration of 
procedural due process claims raised by members of the branded class, most 
courts apply the prison-specific liberty interest tests established in 1995 by 
the Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner.  In Sandin, the Court held that a 
deprivation within prison does not implicate a liberty interest and thus does 
not require procedural due process protection unless it meets one of two 
tests.  The first applies even if no state statute or prison regulation is 
implicated in the liberty interest claim and requires a finding that the 
condition at stake implicates the Due Process Clause by “exceeding [the 
prisoner’s] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to 
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force” (referred to here as 
the “exceeds the sentence” standard).50  This standard did not forge new 
ground; in citing it, Sandin reinforced a longstanding Court approach to 
liberty interest analysis.51 
The second test was the novel one:  it required courts to assess whether a 
condition imposed by state laws or prison policies creates an “atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life” (referred to here as the “atypical and significant” standard).52  In 
creating the “atypical and significant” standard, the Supreme Court 
admonished lower courts to find liberty interests only in “real concerns 
undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,” not in 
circumstances that it characterized as the “fine-tuning of the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”53  The Court intended this standard to refocus 
 
5301012, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2010) (holding that the inmate who had prior arrests 
but no convictions for sexual offenses had no liberty interest in avoiding registration as a 
sex offender, as he had not “offered evidence demonstrating the ‘plus’” of the “stigma 
plus” standard). 
 50 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  This standard has also been referred to as 
the “independent due process liberty interest.”  See, e.g., Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 
315, 325 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A prisoner may be deprived of a liberty interest in violation of 
the Constitution in two ways:  (1) when severe changes in conditions of confinement 
amount to a grievous loss that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice 
and an adequate hearing . . . . The first is the so-called independent due process liberty 
interest . . . .”). 
 51 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 479 n.4 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980), and 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990), for the principle that “the Due 
Process Clause itself confers a liberty interest in certain situations”). 
 52 Id. at 484.  This standard has also been referred to as the “state-created liberty interest.”  
See, e.g., Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 325. 
 53 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483–84.  The plaintiff in Sandin, DeMont Conner, who was serving a 
life sentence for murder, challenged the sufficiency of a disciplinary hearing that lead to 
a thirty-day segregation in a Special Holding Unit on procedural due process grounds.  
Id. at 474–76.  The Court denied him relief, noting that the disciplinary segregation he 
endured “with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates 
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lower courts on the “nature of the deprivation” rather than the “language of 
a particular [prison] regulation,” with the goal of allowing prisons to 
operate with greater freedom by removing the yoke of judicial oversight that 
had previously veered, in the Court’s eyes, into micromanagement.54 
Courts have applied both the “exceeds the sentence” and the “atypical 
and significant” tests in determining whether inmates in the branded class 
have a liberty interest in avoiding classification and treatment as sexual 
offenders.  When courts applying either Sandin standard focus on the 
conditions prisons impose on members of the branded class separately from 
the stigma of the sex offender label, they generally fail to find that prisoners 
have a liberty interest in avoiding the application of the conditions to 
themselves.  Courts taking this approach can find support in cases holding 
that prisoners have no liberty interest in particular prison conditions, such 
as visitation with family or friends or being held in a particular prison.55  
After a review of the cases applying Sandin’s standards to the branded class, 
it appears that only by focusing on stigma have courts consistently found 
that these prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding classification and 
treatment as sexual offenders. 
Before addressing the significance of stigma in these cases, it is useful to 
take a closer look at why conditions, standing alone, have not been a reliable 
basis for liberty interest claims raised by members of the branded class 
under either of Sandin’s liberty interest tests. 
1.  Analyzing Prison Conditions Under the “Atypical and Significant” 
Standard 
Prison conditions can, of course, be “atypical and significant” regardless 
of stigma.  In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court held that incarceration in a 
Supermax facility “imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any 
plausible baseline.”56  But the fact that the Court has not defined how such 
 
in administrative segregation and protective custody” and thus was neither atypical nor 
significant.  Id. at 486. 
 54 Id. at 481. 
 55 See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (“The denial of prison 
access to a particular visitor is ‘well within the terms of confinement ordinarily 
contemplated by a prison sentence’ and therefore is not independently protected by the 
Due Process Clause.” (internal citations omitted)); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 
(1976) (“The Constitution does not require that the State have more than one prison for 
convicted felons; nor does it guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any 
particular prison . . . .”). 
 56 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) (relying on the following factors in 
making its “atypical and significant” finding:  highly restricted human contact in 
Supermax facilities; constant light; limited exercise; indefinite duration with limited 
review; and the fact that inmates in the facility are ineligible for parole). 
1072 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
baselines, plausible or otherwise, should be drawn leaves lower courts at a 
loss as to how best to make determinations of atypicality and significance.57  
In determining whether a condition is atypical or significant, courts 
therefore variously look to everything from the commonality of the 
condition in the prison system, to its effect on the length of the prisoner’s 
sentence, to what other courts have said about the type of condition at 
issue.58 
As a result, courts applying Sandin’s “atypical and significant” standard to 
conditions imposed on members of the branded class have found that no 
liberty interest was implicated by conditions as diverse as restricted visitation 
with child family members;59 sexual offender treatment in prison in 
general;60 or sexual offender treatment as a precondition of parole 
eligibility.61  For example, in Cooper v. Garcia, the prison classified Mr. Garcia 
as a sex offender based on a prior arrest for a sexual assault charge that was 
ultimately dismissed.  Mr. Garcia asserted that he had a liberty interest in 
avoiding the restrictions on visitation with his wife and children that arose as 
a result of the sex offender classification.62  The Court held that this 
 
 57 In Wilkinson, the Court itself acknowledged, but did not attempt to resolve, the fact that 
Sandin’s holding had led lower courts to develop conflicting methods for, in the Court’s 
words, “identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in 
any particular prison system.”  Id. at 223.  By way of example, in Hill v. Fleming, the Tenth 
Circuit noted that “[w]hen considering whether the conditions, duration or restrictions 
are atypical as compared to other inmates, we have considered as a baseline whether the 
segregation at issue mirrors that imposed on inmates in the same segregation, while at other 
times we have made comparisons with the general prison population.”  173 F. App’x 664, 
669–70 (10th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted). 
 58 See Lee, supra note 19, at 788, 828.  Professor Lee describes the federal circuit courts as 
falling into one of four categories of liberty interest analysis:  those taking a “fact-based” 
approach to the Sandin test (looking at data supporting or refuting the commonality of a 
particular condition); those taking a “law-based” approach (relying on case law discussing 
particular conditions rather than empirical data); those adopting a “narrow” approach 
(“equivalent to having a bright-line rule against finding a state-created liberty interest 
except in those rare circumstances where it appears certain that a prisoner’s period of 
incarceration was lengthened as a result of the challenged action”); and those taking a 
“broad” approach (neither consistently relying on case law nor consistently relying on 
empirical evidence when applying the Sandin test).  See also Myra A. Sutanto, Wilkinson v. 
Austin and the Quest for a Clearly Defined Liberty Interest Standard, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1047 (2006) (describing four different baselines that the federal 
circuit courts have applied when making determinations regarding the typicality and 
significance of prison conditions:  “(1) the effect on the length of sentence, (2) the 
conditions faced by typical inmates, (3) the most restrictive prison conditions statewide, 
and (4) the conditions faced in administrative segregation”). 
 59 See, e.g., Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
 60 See, e.g., Tinsley v. Goord, No. 05 Civ. 3921, 2006 WL 2707324, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2006). 
 61 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Nix, No. 1:05-CV-2349-JOF, 2007 WL 779067, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 
8, 2007). 
 62 Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. 
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condition did not constitute an “atypical and significant” hardship because 
many inmates experience restrictions on family visitation during their time 
in prison.63  Similarly, in Tinsley v. Goord, the court held that New York state 
law and prison regulations did not create a liberty interest in avoiding sex 
offender classification, nor did requiring an inmate to participate in sexual 
offender treatment constitute an atypical or significant hardship such that a 
prisoner’s constitutional due process rights were implicated under Sandin—
even in the case of a prisoner like Mr. Tinsley, who had been acquitted by a 
jury of sexual assault charges.64 
2.  Analyzing Prison Conditions Under the “Exceeds the Sentence” 
Standard 
When courts apply the “exceeds the sentence” standard to procedural 
due process claims brought by members of the branded class, they rely on 
the pre-Sandin case Vitek v. Jones, which Sandin cites for the principle that 
liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause.65  In Vitek, the Court 
found that the “stigmatizing consequences” of involuntary commitment to a 
mental hospital, when accompanied by “mandatory behavior modification as 
a treatment for mental illness,” are deprivations that deviate so drastically 
from the types of confinement conditions warranted by a prison sentence 
that their imposition constitutes a “grievous loss” to the inmate.66  It is that 
combination of factors—the labeling of an inmate as mentally ill coupled 
with the physical transfer of the inmate to a mental hospital—that, in the 
Court’s eyes, implicate a liberty interest that could not be infringed upon 
without due process.67 
The Vitek Court, like Paul, found a liberty interest in the combination of 
stigma and a specific type of consequence—the “mandatory behavior 
modification” involved in mental health treatment—associated with that 
stigma.68  As under Paul, stigma must accompany the condition, just as a 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Goord, 2006 WL 2707324, at *4–5 (noting that “[s]ome circuits have held that a prisoner’s 
classification as a sex offender during imprisonment implicates a liberty interest,” but the 
Second Circuit was not among them); see also Lucas v. Dickman, No. 08-cv-01310-ZLW-
KMT, 2009 WL 1810916, at *6 (D. Colo. June 23, 2009) (concluding that an inmate 
classified as a sex offender based on a dismissed sexual assault charge had no liberty 
interest in avoiding the consequences he experienced as a result; fear of bodily injury and 
loss of job opportunities were not atypical and significant hardships). 
 65 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479 n.4 (1995). 
 66 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488, 493–94 (1980) (“Our cases . . . reflect an 
understanding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range 
of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual.”). 
 67 Id. at 494. 
 68 Id. 
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particular type of condition must accompany the stigma, in order for a 
liberty interest to exist.  In Vitek, the Court noted that the conditions that 
Mr. Vitek experienced in the mental institution in which he was confined, 
considered alone, “might not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest 
retained by a prisoner.”69 
Courts applying Sandin to procedural due process claims brought by 
members of the branded class have demonstrated that they will find liberty 
interests only in conditions comparable to those found in Vitek—conditions 
that are mandatory and/or involve behavior modifying attributes70—and 
that those conditions would be insufficient to create a liberty interest in and 
of themselves.  For example, in Kramer v. Donald, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that Mr. Kramer, who was serving time for a non-sexual offense, had no 
liberty interest in avoiding mandatory participation in sex offender 
counseling because he was not formally classified as a sex offender; the 
counseling alone had no liberty interest implications.71  In Neal v. Shimoda, 
the Court suggested in dicta that if the prison simply required an inmate in 
the branded class to complete a sexual offender treatment program, without 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 See, e.g., Stevens v. Robles, No. 06CV2072-LAB, 2008 WL 667407, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 
2008) (holding that the prison’s imposition of a sex offender label on Mr. Stevens, 
although he had never been convicted of a sexual offense, and the resulting denial of 
family visitation due to that label, did not trigger a liberty interest as “Stevens alleges no 
facts from which it may be inferred that his parole eligibility or good time credits or any 
other effect that could impact the fact or duration of his conviction and sentence is 
implicated, nor that he is compelled to complete a sex offender program before he can 
be parole-eligible, nor that he confess to past sex offenses or the like, from which a 
combination of factors could be found to trigger a liberty interest”); see also Cooper v. 
Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that “[b]ased on statements 
by the courts in Vitek and Neal, the liberty interest at stake must be more than a mere ‘sex 
offender’ classification or a ‘mental illness’ classification”).  Garcia clarifies that the 
classification must also be “‘coupled with’ some mandatory, coercive treatment which affects a 
liberty interest, such as parole release as in Neal, or a physical transfer to a mental hospital 
for involuntary confinement as in Vitek.”  Id.  “In this case, however, the sex offender 
classification is coupled with the denial of family visitation ‘privileges,’ the latter not 
rising to a liberty interest.”  Id.  In Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 332 n.2, 335 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 2006), the Fifth Circuit noted that the Coleman cases were limited to situations 
involving “registration and therapy conditions,” not the denial of participation in a 
computer skills program of which, among other circumstances, Mr. Williams complained. 
 71 See Kramer v. Donald, 286 F. App’x 674, 677 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Mr. 
Kramer had not been classified as a sex offender, but that the Parole Board “determined 
only that the non-sexual offense for which Kramer has been imprisoned also had a sexual 
component that warrants counseling; neither the Board nor the Georgia Department of 
Corrections has classified or otherwise labeled Kramer as a sex offender”—and thus this 
action was “insufficiently stigmatizing” to implicate a liberty interest).  The Eleventh 
Circuit so held despite the fact that, in Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999), 
decided almost a decade before Kramer, it found that Mr. Kirby had a liberty interest in 
avoiding classification as a sex offender when that classification was accompanied by sex 
offender treatment.  See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.  
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an accompanying sex offender classification, that obligation would not, by 
itself, implicate a liberty interest.72 
3.  How Stigma Impacts Liberty Interest Analysis Under Sandin v. 
Conner 
Courts, as we have seen, generally do not find that members of the 
branded class have a liberty interest at stake when considering prison 
conditions alone under Paul or Sandin.  Paul clarified that stigma by itself 
can never give rise to a liberty interest deserving of procedural due process 
protections.  But courts have identified liberty interests deserving of 
procedural due process protection for the branded class when, citing Vitek, 
they incorporate considerations of stigma into Sandin’s “atypical and 
significant” and “exceeds the sentence” tests.  Although Vitek’s stigma-plus-
condition approach to liberty interest identification looks like Paul’s “stigma 
plus” approach, in practice Vitek gives courts greater latitude both in 
defining “stigma” and in identifying what types of associated prison 
conditions give rise to a liberty interest than Paul. 
Five federal circuit courts—the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh—have held that inmates who have never been convicted of a 
sexual offense have a liberty interest in avoiding classification and treatment 
as sexual offenders.73  In each of these cases, it is the court’s focus on the 
stigma of the sex offender classification, rather than the prison or parole 
conditions alone, that significantly contributed to its liberty interest 
determination.  A closer look at each of these cases illuminates the role that 
stigma played in the court’s conclusion that members of the branded class 
 
 72 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The liberty interest implicated by 
the establishment of the [Sex Offender Treatment Program] is not merely the 
requirement that sex offenders complete the specified treatment program.  If that were 
all that was at stake, we could probably not say that a liberty interest had been created, 
given the fact that prisons frequently maintain treatment and behavioral modification 
programs (such as anger management or alcohol abuse classes) that have long withstood 
legal challenge.  The liberty interest at stake in this case is similar in form and scope to 
the interest at stake in Vitek:  the stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex 
offender’ label coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory 
treatment program whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility 
create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.”). 
 73 No other federal circuit courts have so held, although lower courts have relied on these 
decisions in finding liberty interests for members of the branded class.  See, e.g., Gilmore 
v. Bostic, 636 F. Supp. 2d 496, 511–12 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (“Like the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, the court concludes that a sex offender treatment program could 
constitute a change in the conditions of confinement so severe as to essentially exceed 
the sentence imposed by the court.”).  The court also noted that the plaintiff has a liberty 
interest in parole under the West Virginia Constitution.  Id. 
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were entitled to procedural due process protections before prisons can 
designate them as sex offenders and treat them accordingly. 
In Neal v. Shimoda, the Hawaiian Department of Public Safety classified 
Neal, who was originally charged with sexual assault but pled guilty to a non-
sexual offense, as a sexual offender based on allegations that he had 
engaged in sexual misconduct during the course of his crime.74  Analogizing 
Mr. Neal’s situation to that in Vitek, and concluding that “[w]e can hardly 
conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than 
the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender,” the Ninth Circuit held 
that it was the combination of this stigmatizing label and the fact that Neal 
was required to take part in mandatory sexual offender treatment in order 
to be considered for parole that implicated a liberty interest requiring 
procedural due process protections under Sandin’s “atypical and significant 
hardship” standard.75 
The Eleventh Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in Kirby v. 
Siegelman.76  In Kirby, one of the plaintiffs was serving a sentence for a non-
sexual offense, but was classified as a sex offender by the Alabama 
Department of Corrections based on two prior sexual assault charges that 
had been dismissed.77  The Eleventh Circuit enumerated the consequences 
of this classification—participation in group therapy sessions of Sexual 
Offenders Anonymous as a prerequisite to parole eligibility and ineligibility 
for minimum security classification (which prevented him from being 
considered for some work-release and community programs)—and, in 
holding that the plaintiff had a liberty interest at stake under Sandin’s 
“exceeds the sentence” standard, followed Neal’s lead in analogizing the 
situation to that in Vitek.78 
In Chambers v. Colorado, the Tenth Circuit addressed the Colorado 
Department of Corrections’ (“CDOC”) practice of assigning sex offender 
status to persons who had never been convicted of a sexual offense.79  Mr. 
Chambers was serving a sentence for a non-sexual offense when the CDOC 
 
 74 See Neal, 131 F.3d at 822. 
 75 Id. at 829–30 (“The classification of an inmate as a sex offender is precisely the type of 
‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life’ that the Supreme Court held created a protected liberty interest.”). 
 76 Kirby, 195 F.3d at 1285. 
 77 Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 78 Id. at 1291–92.  The Kirby Court elected the “exceeds the sentence” standard because it 
found that Alabama “has not created a liberty interest in not being classified as a sex 
offender absent a conviction for a sex related crime.  Indeed, the [Alabama Department 
of Corrections’] regulations specifically declare otherwise.”  Id. 
 79 See Chambers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d. 1237 (10th Cir. 2000) (deciding 
whether classifying an inmate as a sex offender and ordering him to take part in a sex 
offender treatment program involves a liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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classified him as a sexual offender based on a prior dismissed sexual assault 
charge.80  After he was so classified, Mr. Chambers continued to receive 
good time and earned time credits.81  These earned time credits were 
reduced, however, when Mr. Chambers denied having committed the sexual 
assault, thus rendering him ineligible to participate in sexual offender 
treatment.82  The Tenth Circuit held that because Mr. Chambers received 
earned time credits for many years after he was labeled as a sexual offender, 
removing those credits, when coupled with a mandatory sexual offender 
label “replete with inchoate stigmatization,” required procedural scrutiny 
under the Due Process Clause.83  While the Court cited Sandin, Vitek, Neal, 
and Kirby, it did not specify which of Sandin’s liberty interest tests it was 
applying to Mr. Chambers’ claim. 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the liberty interests involved in the 
classification of an inmate as a sexual offender in the absence of a conviction 
for a sexual offense in the two Coleman v. Dretke cases.84  Mr. Coleman was on 
parole for a non-sexual offense when the state of Texas indicted him on a 
charge of sexual assault on a child.  The prosecution eventually dismissed 
the sexual assault charge in exchange for Mr. Coleman’s plea of guilty to 
misdemeanor assault.85  His parole was revoked as a result of this plea, but 
when he was re-released on parole, the parole panel required him to register 
as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy.86  Again relying on the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Vitek, the Fifth Circuit held that the stigmatizing 
sex offender label coupled with compelled sexual offender treatment as a 
condition of parole—treatment that involved “intrusive and behavior-
modifying techniques” and was “qualitatively different” from the other types 
of counseling or treatment required of inmates upon their release on 
parole87—created a liberty interest in freedom from sexual offender 
 
 80 Id. at 1238–39. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 1239. 
 83 Id. at 1242. Interestingly, in Gwinn v. Awmiller, a case discussing the procedural due 
process protections due to members of the branded class post-Chambers, the Court 
indicated it had found a liberty interest in Chambers under Paul’s “stigma plus” standard.  
354 F.3d 1211, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); 
Chambers, 205 F.3d at 1237).  This is surprising, as the Chambers decision did not cite to 
Paul or the “stigma plus” standard, but rather relied on Sandin and cases interpreting 
Sandin as it applied to members of the branded class (although it did, at one point, 
reference the Department of Corrections’ reliance on “the ‘stigma plus’ the Court 
required in Sandin v. Conner to implicate a liberty interest”).  Chambers, 205 F.3d at 1241 
(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Paul, 424 U.S.at  693). 
 84 See Coleman v. Dretke (Coleman I), 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied, (Coleman 
II), 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 85 See Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 219. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 223. 
1078 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
classifications and conditions under Sandin’s “exceeds the sentence” 
standard.88  In the second Coleman case, the Fifth Circuit further explained 
that “by requiring [Coleman] to attend sex offender therapy, the state 
labeled him a sex offender—a label which strongly implies that Coleman has 
been convicted of a sex offense and which can undoubtedly cause ‘adverse 
social consequences.’”89 
Finally, in Renchenski v. Williams, the Third Circuit addressed the 
procedural due process claims raised when the Pennsylvania prison system 
classified Mr. Renchenski, who was serving a sentence for murder, as a sex 
offender even though he had no sexual assault conviction history.90  The 
prison based the classification on evidence in the Pre-Sentence Report 
concerning the circumstances of the homicide, and on the same Report’s 
conclusion that sex was an issue of concern for Mr. Renchenski.91  Based on 
this information, a prison counselor classified him as a sexual offender and 
required him to take part in three sex offender treatment programs.92  The 
court held that the prison’s classification of Renchenski as a sexual offender 
was stigmatizing.93  Further, the court noted that the sex offender program 
to which Renchenski was subjected was analogous to the “compelled 
treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs” at 
issue in Vitek.94  The court thus held that the combination of stigma and the 
mandatory sex offender therapy evoked a liberty interest under the “exceeds 
the sentence” standard that required procedural due process protections.95 
The Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all considered the 
nature of the conditions imposed upon the prisoners, and it was the 
conditions themselves—the “qualitatively different” nature of sex offender 
therapy, the removal of good time credits that the prisoner had enjoyed for 
years—that played a significant role in the courts’ conclusion that a liberty 
interest requiring procedural due process protections was at stake.  
However, the courts’ analysis of the conditions also takes into account the 
 
 88 Id. at 222–24. 
 89 Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668. 
 90 622 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 91 Id. at 320–21.  The Pre-Sentence Report noted that the homicide victim was found “in an 
isolated rural area, and that ‘the body . . . was clad only in a bra (which was unsnapped 
and pulled over the breasts), a blouse which was also above the breasts, and socks.’”  Id.  
The Report went on to note injuries to the victim’s body and genitals, including the 
mutilation of one of her breasts, and noted “sexual” as a “past or present problem area” 
for Renchenksi.  Id. 
 92 Id. at 321–22 (describing the Sex Offender Treatment Program in Pennsylvania’s prison 
system as “a seven-phase behavioral modification course” that involves weekly group 
therapy over a two-year period). 
 93 Id. at 326. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 328. 
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stigma imposed on the prisoners at issue, and it is this stigma that played an 
essential role in the courts’ finding that the condition implicated a liberty 
interest requiring procedural due process protections. 
Although the Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and Renchenski decisions 
equated the sex offender label and associated conditions to the “mental 
illness” label and mental hospital transfer in Vitek, this is as far as they take us 
in terms of clarifying the nature of the stigma and accompanying prison 
conditions necessary to trigger a liberty interest under either Sandin 
standard.  What, exactly, did the courts mean by “stigma?”  And when 
“stigma” exists, what types of conditions must accompany that stigma in 
order to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause? 
IV.  WHAT DOES STIGMA MEAN IN THE PRISON SETTING? 
When Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and Renchenski rely on stigma as a 
source of liberty interests behind prison walls, they define a label as 
“stigmatizing” based on the outcomes it may engender.96  Vitek located 
stigma in a label with “adverse social consequences.”97  In Neal, the court 
took its cue from Vitek, pointing to mandatory registration laws aimed at sex 
offenders as one of the “stigmatizing consequences” of sex offender 
 
 96 The courts do not adopt the definition of stigma that courts have applied to the Paul 
“stigma plus” test—that is a label that is derogatory enough to damage a person’s 
reputation, that the person to whom it is applied claims is false, and that can be proven 
false.  See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).  Compare this definition with the concept of reputation as a 
“critical site for autonomous identity formation” posited by Eric J. Mitnick, citing to 
Anthony Appiah’s concept of social labeling that consists of three parts:  1) a recognized 
social label attached to a group of persons, centered around “an external social 
consensus that those who fall within a particular class are alike in certain ways, either in 
terms of appearance, presumed behavior, or other socially detectable tendencies”; 2) the 
“internalization” of the label by those identified by it; 3) “the existence of patterns of 
behavior towards [the labeled group].”  Mitnick also references Robert Post’s 
“conceptions of reputation as property, as honor, and as dignity.”  See Eric J. Mitnick, 
Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
79, 101, 111–13 (2009) (citing Kwame Anthony Appiah, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 65–71 
(2005); Robert C. Post, New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation:  The Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law:  Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986)); see also 
Ball, supra note 9, at 146 (discussing Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s “five components of 
stigma—’labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination,’” that occur 
“in a power situation that allows the components to take hold”) (citing Bruce G. Link & 
Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 377 (2001)). 
 97 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (“It is indisputable that commitment to a 
mental hospital ‘can engender adverse social consequences to the individual’ and that 
‘[w]hether we label this phenomena ‘stigma’ or choose to call it something else . . . we 
recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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classification.98  The Neal court’s “stigmatizing consequences” language was 
cited in Kirby, while the Chambers court cited both the existence of 
mandatory sex offender registration laws and the danger of mislabeling an 
inmate as a convicted sexual offender in support of its assertion that a sex 
offender label is “replete with inchoate stigmatization.”99  In Coleman II, the 
court noted that “adverse social consequences” would “undoubtedly” unfold 
from the imposition of a sex offender label.100  Renchenski, also citing to 
Vitek’s “adverse consequences” standard, pointed to studies indicating that 
sex offenders are particularly vulnerable to sexual and physical violence in 
prison in support of its finding that Renchenski was stigmatized by the sex 
offender label.101 
These courts, as they seek to identify a liberty interest for prisoners in the 
branded class, associate the stigma of a label with its risk of adverse effects 
on the person labeled.  But they actually mean something more than that.  It 
is well established that persons who have been convicted of sexual offenses 
have no liberty interest in avoiding classification as a sexual offender102 or 
avoiding sex offender conditions, including registration and sex offender 
treatment.103  Prisons therefore do not “stigmatize” prisoners in ways 
forbidden by the Due Process Clause when they classify inmates in ways 
consistent with the offenses for which they were convicted, although those 
 
 98 See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Vitek, 445 U.S. at 480).  The 
court also cited to the fact that, like mental illness at the time that Vitek was decided, the 
origins of sexual deviancy remain largely a scientific mystery as a source of stigma. 
 99 See Chambers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d. 1237, 1242 n.13 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing that a label of “sex offender” is one with emotional connotations and 
noting that “the possibilities for mischaracterization and mischief are always present when 
such a label is affixed”). 
100 See Coleman v. Dretke (Coleman II), 409 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2005) (further clarifying 
that a label with such consequences can be stigmatizing even if it is not made public). 
101 See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (providing evidence that sex 
offenders are subject to intense beatings and sexual abuse inside of prisons). 
102 See, e.g., Rainge-El v. Moschetti, No. 05-cv-01831-PSF-CBS, 2006 WL 1876632, at *2–4 (D. 
Colo. July 6, 2006). 
103 See, e.g., Neal, 131 F.3d at 831 (rejecting the procedural due process and ex post facto 
challenges to Hawaii’s sex offender treatment program raised by Marshall Martinez, who 
was serving a prison sentence after having been convicted of attempted rape.  Mr. 
Martinez also had two prior convictions for rape and attempted sexual assault.  The court 
held that “[a]gainst this background, it is clear that Martinez received all the process to 
which he was due . . . .  An inmate who has been convicted of a sex crime in a prior 
adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has 
received the minimum protections required by due process.  Prison officials need do no 
more than notify such an inmate that he has been classified as a sex offender because of 
the prior conviction for a sex crime.”); see also, Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (holding that plaintiff had no right, under the Due Process Clause, to 
contest inclusion in a sex offender registry because he had been convicted of a sexual 
offense; “[T]he law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a 
convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest”). 
Apr. 2013] RIGHTS OF THE STIGMATIZED PRISONER 1081 
 
classifications may have an impact on the inmates’ well-being, social status, 
and even physical safety.  Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and Renchenski were 
therefore not just concerned about adverse consequences of the sex 
offender label; they were concerned about the possible imposition of those 
consequences on a prisoner in the absence of a conviction for a sexual 
offense. 
Vitek found that the state’s labeling of an inmate as mentally ill and 
committing him against his will to a mental hospital was a combination of 
factors “qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically 
suffered by a person convicted of crime.”104  What makes a “sex offender” 
label stigmatizing in Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and Renchenski also has to 
do with its qualitative differences—not from what is characteristically 
suffered by a person convicted of “crime” in general, but from what an 
inmate convicted of a non-sexual crime can be expected to endure.105  Just as 
adverse prison conditions carry no liberty interest implications “[a]s long as 
the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected 
is within the sentence imposed upon him,”106 a label imposed by a prison on 
an inmate only has liberty interest implications if the label is untethered to 
the inmate’s conviction history.  It is this type of stigmatizing classification, 
when associated with prison conditions equivalent to the “[c]ompelled 
treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs” found 
in Vitek,107 that Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and Renchenski held to 
implicate a liberty interest requiring procedural due process protections. 
These decisions reflect, then, a concern about a certain type of 
government-imposed stigma—accusing an individual of committing a 
criminal act—that has roots in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The 
dissenting Justices in Paul108 pointed to the Court’s decisions in In Re 
Winship109 and Jenkins v. McKeithen110 as evidence that the Court had 
previously been protective of the rights of the individual to be free of 
government-imposed accusations of crime without due process.111  In 
Winship, the Court held that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
should be applied to juvenile adjudications, citing both the child’s interest 
 
104 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980). 
105 The Fifth Circuit made this clear in Coleman II, when it found that the prison’s imposition 
of certain sex-offender-specific conditions on an inmate with no sex offense convictions 
was stigmatizing precisely because that action “strongly implies” that the inmate “has been 
convicted of a sex offense.”  409 F.3d at 668. 
106 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 
107 Id. at 492. 
108 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714–35 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
109 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970). 
110 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969). 
111 Paul, 424 U.S. at 724–26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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in his potential loss of liberty and “the certainty that he would be stigmatized 
by the conviction.”112  In Jenkins v. McKeithen, the Court held that persons 
investigated by a state-created commission with the power to make findings 
regarding criminal activity113 should be entitled to the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence in his or her own 
defense.114  The Court held that both rights are “particularly fundamental 
when the proceeding allegedly results in a finding that a particular 
individual was guilty of a crime.”115  In light of this history, the dissent in Paul 
was seemingly dumbfounded by the majority’s failure to find that Mr. Paul 
had a liberty interest in avoiding being labeled an “active shoplifter” by the 
police—an act that imposed upon Mr. Paul “the stigmatizing label ‘criminal’ 
without the salutary and constitutionally mandated safeguards of a criminal 
trial.”116 
The cases finding a liberty interest for inmates in the branded class 
demonstrate that the concern about this particular type of stigma—
government accusations of criminal acts leveled against its citizens—lives on 
in Sandin, despite Paul’s holding that such an accusation, standing alone, 
has no liberty interest implications.117  Although Vitek, when applied to either 
Sandin test, requires that “stigma” be accompanied by a specific sort of 
condition in a way reminiscent of Paul’s “stigma plus” standard, this 
approach departs from Paul in that it provides an opportunity for an 
expanded definition of the type of labels and consequences that deserve 
procedural due process protections behind bars.  Further, Vitek reminds us 
that a label can be stigmatizing even if it does not implicate an individual in 
a criminal act.  If stigma is part of what makes a prison condition “atypical 
 
112 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–64; see also, Ball, supra note 9, at 137 (“Winship identifies two 
liberty interests—first, the interest in avoiding a commitment to reform school, and 
second, the stigma of being adjudged a delinquent.  This stigmatic interest is a liberty 
interest in its own right, one which Apprendi also identifies separately . . . . I argue that the 
presence or absence of stigma explains the difference between deprivations which 
require Apprendi/Winship protections and those which do not.” (footnotes omitted)). 
113 The Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry was created by the state to 
investigate and make findings regarding potential violations of criminal laws related to 
labor-management relations.  Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 414 (1969). 
114 Id. at 428–29 (emphasizing that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a 
“fundamental aspect of procedural due process,” and that “[t]he right to present 
evidence is, of course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause”). 
115 Id. at 429.  
116 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 718 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
117 Of course, Paul itself didn’t say that the accusation at issue—that Mr. Paul was an “active 
shoplifter,” although he had never been convicted of such an offense—was not injurious 
to his reputation.  Id. at 706.  It held instead that the label alone did not implicate a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.  Id.  It is the definition of “stigma” applied 
to the “stigma plus” analysis under Paul, along with the limitations on what conditions 
constitute a sufficient “plus,” that poses problems for inmates in the branded class. 
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and significant,” or what causes a prison condition to “exceed the sentence” 
in a way deserving of procedural due process protections, then courts would 
benefit from clear guidelines specifying the source of this constitutionally 
significant stigma.  Courts, as well as prisons and inmates, would also benefit 
from allowing a broader range of conditions to trigger liberty interests when 
those conditions are accompanied by a stigmatizing label.  We turn first to a 
definition of stigma, and then to the question of conditions. 
A.  The Definition of Stigma 
The case law gives rise to the following definition:  stigma is present 
when a prison imposes a label on an inmate that (a) implies that he has 
committed a criminal act or has a mental disorder; (b) is unrelated to the 
elements of his crimes of conviction; and (c) carries a significant risk of 
adverse consequences to the inmate. 
This definition incorporates both a prison designation of any inmate as 
“mentally ill” and the designation of inmates in the branded class as “sexual 
offenders,” while giving greater guidance to courts addressing inmate liberty 
interests arising from other circumstances.  Further, this definition ensures 
that only specific types of stigmatizing labels—those that degrade and 
defame in a particular way, with significant risks associated with them—have 
liberty interest implications, preventing courts (and prisons) from being 
overwhelmed with procedural due process claims based on stigmatizing 
labels without constitutional significance.  Finally, this definition serves to 
create a framework within which courts should always find that stigma with 
liberty interest implications is present; this is not to say that courts could not 
find stigma elsewhere, in other types of labels, in circumstances 
unconsidered by the definition posited here. 
Courts adopting this definition when analyzing procedural due process 
claims within prisons would thus ask three threshold questions.  First, the 
court would ask whether the prison (either implicitly118 or explicitly) 
imposed a label on a prisoner that implies that he has committed a criminal 
act or has a mental disorder.  If so, the court would then ask if the label is 
based on the elements of his crimes of conviction.  In so doing, the court 
should consider whether there is a clear nexus between the label the prison 
imposed upon the prisoner and the elements of the offenses for which he 
sustained convictions in court.  If no such nexus exists, the court should 
 
118 The lack of a formal prison-imposed classification is not dispositive; in line with the 
approach taken by Coleman II, if the prison imposes conditions on an inmate that are 
strongly associated with a particular status—i.e., sex offender treatment—that action is 
the functional equivalent of labeling an inmate as a sex offender and should be analyzed 
in the same way. 
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next ask whether the label at issue carries a significant risk of adverse 
consequences.  If the answer to this final question is yes, courts should find 
that the label is stigmatizing.  When such stigma is present, courts should 
find that the inmate at issue has a liberty interest in avoiding the 
stigmatizing label and its attendant consequences under either Sandin 
standard.119 
A close look at the Federal Security Designation and Custody 
Classification Manual demonstrates how this definition of stigma might 
apply to inmates other than those in the branded class.  It also illuminates 
the complexity involved in prison classification systems, which brings an 
added challenge to the application of the stigma test described above.  The 
Manual establishes the factors required to achieve the Bureau of Prisons’ 
(“BOP”) objective of placing inmates in the “most appropriate security level 
institution” to meet both the inmate’s individual needs and protect 
society.120  The prison first assigns a numerical score to an inmate that 
indicates “security level institution” to which they will be assigned—ranging 
from a minimum to high level of security.121  The scores are based on a 
range of factors, including program recommendations made by the court at 
sentencing, the length of the sentence, the “severity of the current offense,” 
the inmate’s history of violence, history of escapes and attempts, drug or 
alcohol abuse, and the inmate’s age.122  A series of “Management Variable” 
factors—including prison concerns like population management, or moving 
the inmate to another facility for participation in a particular program123—
can impact the inmate’s security level, as can a host of “Public Safety 
Factors,” including the inmate’s membership in a “disruptive group,” 
 
119 Although Vitek, a pre-Sandin case, applied the “exceeds the sentence” standard, its 
principles should not be limited to that test; courts can find that a stigmatizing label 
contributes to the “atypicality and significance” of a prison condition, or that it “exceeds 
the sentence” in an unexpected manner, because, in addition to the adverse 
consequences the label engenders, it is disconnected from the prisoner’s crimes of 
conviction.  Indeed, Neal explicitly applied Vitek to Sandin’s “atypical and significant” 
standard.  See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828–29 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Our analysis is 
aided substantially by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vitek v. Jones . . . . The parallels 
between Vitek and this case are striking . . . . The classification of an inmate as a sex 
offender is precisely the type of ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’ that the Supreme Court held created a 
protected liberty interest.” (citation omitted)). 
120 INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 3,  at 1. 
121 Id. at ch. 1, at 2 (depicting a chart of security and custody levels based on inmates’ 
numerical scores by gender). 
122 Id. at ch. 4, at 5–16 (detailing the factors used to determine an inmate’s security level). 
123 Id. at ch. 5, at 1–6 (listing “Management Valiable” codes and corresponding 
descriptions). 
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designation as a sex offender, sentence length, violent behavior, or 
involvement in a prison disturbance.124 
The Manual emphasizes that, although the classification system is 
“objective and consistent,” it also allows prison officials to exercise their 
discretion in making classification decisions.125  In assessing the factors 
applicable to a particular inmate, the Manual sometimes requires prison 
officials to take into consideration only those acts for which the inmate has 
been found culpable in a prior proceeding.  When evaluating the inmate’s 
history of violence, for example, the prison official may consider “only those 
acts for which there are documented findings of guilt.”126  At other times, 
the prison official is not so limited;127 and it is here that considerations of 
stigma may come into play.  Two examples illustrate this point:  the BOP’s 
assessment of the “severity” of an inmate’s “current offense” and its 
assessment of whether an inmate is a drug or alcohol abuser. 
The Manual requires prison officials determining the severity of the 
inmate’s current offense—a factor that impacts the inmate’s security level 
score—to enter the “number of points that reflect the most severe 
documented instant offense behavior regardless of the conviction 
offense.”128  By way of example, the Manual states that when evaluating an 
 
124 Id. at ch. 5, at 7–13 (“A Public Safety Factor (PSF) is relevant factual information 
regarding the inmate’s current offense, sentence, criminal history or institutional 
behavior that requires additional security measures be employed to ensure the safety and 
protection of the public.”). 
125 Id. at 1 (“2. Program Objectives.  The expected results of this Program Statement are:  a. 
Each inmate will be placed in a facility commensurate with their security and program 
needs through an objective and consistent system of classification which also allows staff 
to exercise their professional judgment . . . .”). 
126 Id. at ch. 4, at 9 (noting that findings of guilt could have occurred in a variety of settings, 
from court to parole violation proceedings, and include “the individual’s entire 
background of criminal violence”).  Findings of guilt are also required in order for prison 
officials to find that an inmate has an escape history or has been involved in a prison 
disturbance.  See id. at ch. 4, at 10 (“Enter the appropriate number of points that reflect 
the escape history of the individual considering only those acts for which there are 
documented findings of guilt . . . .”); see also id. at ch. 5, at 10 (“A male or female inmate 
who was involved in a serious incident of violence within the institution and was found 
guilty of the prohibited act(s) of Engaging, Encouraging a Riot, or acting in furtherance 
of such . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
127 Id. at ch. 5, at 8.  As another example, it is perhaps, at this point in the Article, 
unsurprising to learn that “[a] conviction is not required” in order for a prison official to 
label an inmate as a sex offender, so long as the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”), “or other official documentation, clearly indicates” that one of an enumerated 
list of sexual crimes occurred.  The Manual further explains that a prior case that was 
dismissed or nolle prosequi cannot be considered, but “in the case where an inmate was 
charged with an offense that included one of the following elements, but as a result of a 
plea bargain was not convicted, application of this [Public Safety Factor] should be 
entered.”  Id. 
128 Id. at ch. 4, at 6–7. 
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inmate who was “involved in an Assault with Serious Injury” (which carries 
seven points on the severity scale) “but pled guilty to a Simple Assault” 
(carrying three points on the severity scale), the prison should assign the 
inmate seven points because this score reflects the “more severe 
documented behavior.”129 
A court assessing whether this inmate had been stigmatized by this 
classification would first ask if the prison has labeled the inmate in a way that 
implies that he committed a criminal act.  Here, the prison official assigned 
the inmate seven points based on a finding that the inmate was “involved 
with” an “Assault with Serious Injury”; thus the first prong is satisfied.  The 
court would then inquire as to whether the label is related to the elements 
of the crime to which he pled guilty—a simple assault that did not involve 
serious injury—and, here, too, the inmate should prevail.  The elements of 
simple assault conviction do not contain any mention of serious bodily 
injury, thus there is no nexus between the simple assault conviction and the 
assault with serious injury label.  Finally, the court must decide if the label 
carries a significant risk of adverse consequences; any negative repercussions 
related to being labeled as a person who committed a serious assault should 
be taken into consideration by the court here.  For example, the court might 
find that being known in the prison as a person culpable of serious assaults 
exposes inmates to violent attacks or unwanted pressure to join prison 
gangs, or that the additional points will result in the prison placing the 
inmate in a prison environment where he is more likely to be victimized in 
some way.  The court might also consider the impact of this classification on 
the prisoner on parole, or on his reputation in the community.  Here, the 
inmate’s claim would rise or fall depending on the court’s assessment of 
both the likelihood and the seriousness of any consequences associated with 
the label at issue. 
This definition of stigma, because it requires the government-imposed 
label to relate to criminal acts or mental illness, and because that label must 
also carry a significant risk of adverse effects, does not extend procedural 
due process protections every time a prison labels an inmate in a way 
inconsistent with the elements of his conviction.  Consider another factor 
used to assess an inmate’s security level within the BOP:  the inmate’s abuse 
of drugs or alcohol.130  A prisoner with no drug or alcohol abuse issues is 
given zero points; one with drug or alcohol issues is given one point.  In 
assessing whether a particular inmate has abused drugs or alcohol, a prison 
official is permitted to consider factors ranging from convictions for a drug 
 
129 Id. at ch. 4, at 7. 
130 Id. at ch. 4, at 13. 
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or alcohol related offense to a positive drug test to a finding that the inmate 
went through “detoxification.”131 
An inmate convicted of theft, with no drug or alcohol related 
convictions, could thus nevertheless have a prison official determine that he 
had an issue with alcohol abuse based, for example, on a statement in a 
police report that the defendant was believed to be drunk at the time the 
theft occurred.  In making this determination, and imposing the additional 
point on this hypothetical inmate, the prison may fairly be said to have 
labeled him an “alcoholic.”  The inmate may feel stigmatized by this label, 
and frustrated by the added point, and may therefore wish to raise a 
procedural process claim.  Under the definition of stigma posited above, 
however, this claim is unlikely to be successful.  The “alcoholic” label, while 
unrelated to the elements of the inmate’s conviction, does not imply that 
the inmate committed a criminal act or had a serious mental disorder.  Such 
a label is also not likely to bring about adverse consequences, as a reputation 
for alcohol addiction is not one that generally triggers negative outcomes 
such as social ostracism or violence—although certainly the inmate thus 
labeled could argue otherwise.132  It is, therefore, probably not “stigmatizing” 
in the constitutionally significant sense of that word.  Further, stigma aside, 
it is unlikely that courts would find that the conditions likely to be associated 
with an “alcohol abuse” classification (substance abuse classes or similar 
types of treatment) trigger liberty interest concerns under either Sandin test. 
There are a variety of other prison classifications to which the three-part 
stigma test might be applied—the prison classification of an inmate as a 
gang member or member of another “disruptive group,” for example133—
 
131 Id. (“Examples of drug or alcohol abuse include:  a conviction of a drug or alcohol 
related offense, a parole or probation violation based on drug or alcohol abuse, positive 
drug test, a DUI, detoxification, etc.”). 
132 To give another example, while a prison could place an inmate in a parenting class based 
on information that is not supported by the elements of his crimes of conviction (a 
person convicted of theft might be placed in such a class, for example), it is highly 
unlikely that inclusion in that class implies that the inmate has committed a criminal act 
or is mentally ill, nor is it likely to carry a significant risk of adverse consequences.  This is 
not to say that a prisoner could not make a case that the condition should fall into the 
class of prisoners described by the three questions.  An inmate could argue, for example, 
that the parenting class at issue in his case was known throughout the prison to be 
exclusively assigned to prisoners who have abused children.  An inmate with no child 
abuse convictions might, therefore, have a successful claim that his assignment to this 
particular parenting class was stigmatizing because it carried the implication that he was a 
child abuser, a label that is both unrelated to elements of his crime of conviction and one 
that carries adverse social consequences. 
133 See, e.g., Farr v. Rodriguez, 255 F. App’x 925, 926–28 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
inmate had not been deprived of a liberty interest when the prison identified him as a 
member of the “Aryan Circle” gang and placed him in administrative segregation as a 
result; finding that the stigma of the classification was “insufficient to raise a 
constitutional claim,” and the conditions of administrative segregation did not rise to the 
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but the stigma definition proposed here will not attach constitutional 
significance to all of them.  It does, however, establish parameters for 
judicial assessment of stigma that can bring consistency to liberty interest 
determinations such that persons stigmatized in ways that implicated liberty 
interests in cases from Vitek to Renchenski would receive the procedural due 
process protections afforded the plaintiffs in those cases. 
While the presence of stigma provides a source of liberty interests for 
inmates, it is important to remember that stigma is not required in order for 
a prison condition to implicate a liberty interest under either one of the 
Sandin standards.134  Even if a prisoner could not satisfy the three-part stigma 
test outlined above—when, for example, a classification is based on the 
crime for which he was convicted—the prisoner could still make a successful 
procedural due process claim.  The inmate may argue, for example, that the 
nature of the condition itself was atypical and significant enough, or 
exceeded his sentence to a sufficient degree, to give rise to a liberty 
interest—that the sex offender treatment to which he was subjected was 
particularly unusual, disturbing, or unnecessarily intrusive.135  The presence 
of stigma adds weight to prisoner-brought procedural due process claims, 
but its absence does not create a barrier for inmates seeking to establish 
liberty interests behind bars. 
B.  The Conditions at Issue 
In prison, as in free society, courts have held that stigma alone is not 
enough to trigger a liberty interest; it is the intertwining of stigma and 
prison conditions that gives rise to a liberty interest.  While Vitek located a 
liberty interest in the pairing of a stigmatizing label with mandatory, 
behavior modifying treatment, and the Kirby, Chambers, Neal, Coleman, and 
Renchenski courts analogized sex offender treatment to the mental health 
treatment in Vitek, this section argues that courts should not limit themselves 
 
extreme deprivation experienced by inmates in Supermax prisons addressed in 
Wilkinson); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
“some evidence” standard applies to prison administrative hearings “assigning suspected 
gang affiliates to the Security Housing Unit,” and stating that a probation report, police 
report, and statement from a confidential prison informant indicating that an inmate was 
gang-affiliated all independently satisfied this standard). 
134 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding that an inmate has a 
liberty interest, arising from the Due Process Clause and independent of stigma concerns, 
in avoiding the forced administration of psychotropic drugs). 
135 Even a convicted sex offender might have a liberty interest in avoiding the use of a penile 
plethysmograph.  See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 570 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the Probation Office’s requirement that Mr. Weber, who was convicted of 
possession of child pornography, submit to the imposition of penile plethysmograph 
testing as a condition of supervised release triggered a liberty interest requiring 
procedural due process protections). 
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to considering only these types of conditions as a source of liberty interests 
when stigma is present.  Nor should courts resort to Paul’s requirement that 
stigma be accompanied by the government’s alteration or obliteration of “a 
right or status previously recognized by state law.”136  Rather, courts should 
find that if the prison labels an inmate in the stigmatizing way outlined 
above—one that implies that he has committed a criminal act or has a 
mental disorder, that is unrelated to the elements of his crime(s) of 
conviction, and that carries a significant risk of adverse consequences—the 
inmate has a liberty interest in avoiding the label and any conditions that the 
prison imposed as a consequence of the label itself. 
Sandin requires courts to determine whether a prison condition is 
atypical and significant, or exceeds the inmate’s sentence, in a way requiring 
procedural due process protections.  Sandin provides little insight as to how 
such determinations should be made, and courts have struggled to identify a 
baseline to which conditions can be compared when making liberty interest 
determinations.  The definition of stigma proposed here provides a point of 
comparison for courts in their liberty interest determinations:  the bottom 
line is the crime for which the inmate was convicted.  Under this definition, 
a prison-imposed label is only stigmatizing if (among other considerations) 
it is unrelated to the elements of the inmate’s criminal conviction.  The 
stigma sets the prisoner apart from others who were convicted of the same 
offense.  Conditions imposed as a result of this label are thus atypical and 
significant, or exceed the inmate’s sentence, for the same reason:  they are 
unrelated to the crime for which the inmate was convicted.  If a prison 
would not have imposed a condition on an inmate but for the stigmatizing 
label, the condition is atypical and significant as applied to that prisoner, or 
exceeds that prisoner’s sentence by nature of its complete lack of 
connection to the crime for which he suffered a conviction. 
This approach gives stigma the significance it is due.  It also 
acknowledges the fact that when a prison’s classification of an inmate falls 
within the definition of “stigma” proposed here, that inmate is already being 
treated substantially differently than he would have been were the label not 
imposed.  It also adds clarity to liberty interest determinations under Sandin 
in cases where stigma is present.  When courts select between conditions in 
making liberty interest determinations—finding, for example, that a 
stigmatizing label plus sex offender registration triggers a liberty interest, 
but a stigmatizing label plus mandatory polygraph exams does not137—it is 
 
136 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976). 
137 See, e.g., Branch v. Collier, No. Civ.A. 302CV0021–BF, 2004 WL 942194, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex. 
Apr. 30, 2004) (holding that member of the branded class had a liberty interest in 
avoiding sex offender registration on parole, but no liberty interest in avoiding 
“involuntary psychological counseling and periodic polygraph examinations”). 
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difficult to discern the rationale for the distinction.  Rather than attempting 
to draw fine lines between prison conditions, courts should simply ask 
whether the condition at issue arose as a direct result of the stigmatizing 
label.  If a prison labels an inmate as a sex offender and then requires him to 
participate in sex offender treatment, take a polygraph test, and avoid 
contact with children under eighteen, the inmate has a liberty interest in 
avoiding the label and all such consequences, so long as the consequences 
would not have been imposed but for the stigmatizing label.  Once such a 
stigmatizing label has been imposed, therefore, it should add constitutional 
weight to any condition arising from it. 
V.  WHAT PROCESS IS DUE? 
A prisoner who has successfully run the gauntlet of liberty interest 
analysis faces a second challenge:  the determination of what process is 
sufficient to protect that interest.  Courts finding a liberty interest for 
members of the branded class have granted such prisoners no more than 
the procedural rights guaranteed to inmates facing disciplinary hearings 
under Wolff v. McDonnell.138  Some courts have granted fewer procedural due 
process protections.139  This section briefly argues that inmates in the 
branded class (and those similarly situated) deserve greater procedural due 
process protections than those guaranteed under Wolff, and specifically 
should be granted the right to counsel, a neutral hearing body, the right to 
cross-examine and confront witnesses, and a government-held burden of 
proof.140  Notably, except for the guaranteed right to counsel, these are the 
 
138 See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Mr. Neal, “as an 
inmate who has never been convicted of a sex offense, is entitled to the procedural 
protections outlined by the Supreme Court in Wolff”); Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 
1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (adopting Neal’s conclusion that the Wolff procedures were 
sufficient, noting further that due process also requires that the hearing panel’s decision 
be supported by “some evidence” and conducted by an impartial decisionmaker). 
139 For example, in Jones v. Puckett, a United States District Court within the Seventh Circuit 
held that the plaintiff received adequate process because he had notice of a hearing and 
of a staff psychologist’s recommendation that he be identified and treated as a sex 
offender, an opportunity to be heard, and receipt of a written decision explaining the 
hearing committee’s decision.  160 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (W.D. Wis. 2001).  Although 
the prisoner did not have the psychologist’s written report prior to the hearing, and 
“probably did not have the right to call witnesses in his behalf,” the Court concluded that 
the procedures he received were constitutionally sufficient to protect “any liberty interest” 
he had in the prison’s decision to require him to participate in sexual offender 
treatment.  Id. 
140 In so doing, this section echoes the sentiments of a 1998 Harvard Law Review case note 
criticizing the limitation of the Ninth Circuit’s due process protections in Neal.  See Case 
Note, Criminal Procedure—Ninth Circuit Provides Inadequate Due Process Protections for Accused 
Sex Offenders—Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 2438 
(1998) (comparing the procedures of Wolff to those of Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. 
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procedural due process protections that Vitek granted to the stigmatized 
prisoner at issue in that case.141 
In Wolff, the Court noted that disciplinary hearings are not part of a 
criminal prosecution, and thus the prisoner is not due all the protections of 
the pre-conviction process.  The Court concluded that such hearings require 
some procedural protections—including advance written notice of the 
claimed violation and permission for the inmate to call witnesses and 
present documentary evidence when such permission will not be “unduly 
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”142—but inmates are 
not entitled to counsel, confrontation, or cross-examination.143  Further, in 
Superintendent v. Hill, the Court held that constitutional due process does not 
require that decisions of a prison disciplinary panel be supported by 
evidence “that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the 
disciplinary board,” but rather due process “in this context requires only 
that there be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary 
 
Scarpelli, Supreme Court cases analyzing the procedures required for parole and 
probation revocation proceedings).  Morrissey, the article notes, included all the 
procedures later cited in Wolff, in addition to requiring a neutral hearing body and the 
ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses, while Scarpelli also stated that the right to 
counsel would be mandatory in certain circumstances.  The note concludes that because 
“the classification and its consequences are so severe, prisoners who have not been 
afforded a full trial on sex offense charges need the heightened procedural requirements 
of Morrissey and Scarpelli.”  Id. at 2441 (footnote omitted).  The article further notes that 
Vitek provided prisoners with the type of process provided for in Morrissey.  Id. at 2441–42.  
By granting inmates in the branded class the procedural protections of Wolff, the note 
argued, the Ninth Circuit ignored the inherent adversarial nature of a process designed 
to make a factual determination regarding whether the prisoner had committed a sexual 
crime, a determination with serious consequences that demanded “accurate and just 
results.”  Id. at 2442–43 (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981)).  
Such results could be obtained only by heightened procedural protections, including the 
right to counsel and the placement of the burden of proof on the government.   Id. 
141 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1980); see also Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 
407 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that “except for the right to counsel, the Vitek Court granted 
the inmate facing involuntary transfer to and confinement in a mental hospital the full 
panoply of due process rights available to a defendant facing a criminal trial”).  However, 
in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226–29 (2005), the Court held that Ohio’s 
procedural safeguards before confining an inmate in a Supermax facility—including a 
summary of the factual basis for the classification, allowing the inmate an opportunity for 
rebuttal and an opportunity to submit objections, and “multiple levels of review for any 
decision recommending [Ohio State Penitentiary] placement, with power to overturn the 
recommendation at each level,” including a review within thirty days of the inmate’s 
assignment to the unit—were sufficient to protect the inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding 
confinement in a Supermax facility. 
142 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 563–66 (1974). 
143 Id. at 567–69 (“If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence 
against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there 
would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls.”). 
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hearing,” meager though it may be.144  Inmates have no constitutional right 
to appeal the decision of the disciplinary board.145 
Putting aside the fact that inmates in the branded class are not accused 
of committing disciplinary violations within prison, when courts grant these 
inmates the limited protections guaranteed under Wolff, they underestimate 
the importance of creating due process protections that actually work.146  
Prison safety and effective prisoner rehabilitation and treatment depend on 
a process that allows prisons to make informed conclusions based on 
evidence that has been meaningfully tested.  Money and time are wasted 
when, for example, prisons place inmates who have no need for sex offender 
treatment programs into such programs, and overcrowding in those 
programs reduces space for inmates who are truly in need of treatment.  A 
fear of overburdening prisons with procedural requirements thus may create 
unintended negative consequences for the prison system, both in terms of 
financial impact and in regard to the effect of misclassifying inmate 
behavior.147  Finally, there should be ethical concerns when prisons label an 
inmate in a way that satisfies the definition of stigma proposed in this 
Article, without providing sufficient process to test the underlying facts upon 
which the label is based. 
The minimal process that has been afforded members of the branded 
class reflects our society’s antipathy towards suspected sexual offenders, but 
it also seems to reflect a deep distrust of our criminal justice system.  Prisons 
classify these prisoners as sexual offenders based on charges that have been 
dismissed by the prosecution, or for which they have been acquitted by a 
jury.  In Gunderson v. Hvass, for example, the Eighth Circuit found no 
constitutional impediment to a statute requiring Gunderson to register as a 
sexual offender, despite the fact that the prosecution had dismissed the 
original complaint charging Gunderson with a sexual offense in its entirety, 
 
144 Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). 
145 See, e.g., Salazar v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10–CV–02797–BNB, 2011 WL 149279, at *3 
(D. Colo. Jan. 18, 2011) (quoting Murphy v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 381 F. App’x 828, 832 
(10th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n inmate in state prison does not have a constitutional right to 
appeal his sex offender classification in a prison administrative proceeding.”)). 
146 See Donald F. Tibbs, Peeking Behind the Iron Curtain:  How Law “Works” Behind Prison Walls, 
16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 137, 177–78 (2006) (presenting the results of an ethnographic 
study of inmate disciplinary process at Wisconsin prisons, as well as conclusions about 
what aspects of the disciplinary process “work,” noting that when “real proof that the 
inmate committed an institutional infraction must be provided,” a system “challenges 
arbitrary applications of power along with the exercise of discretion in the absence of 
accountability”). 
147 See Bench & Allen, supra note 4, at 368, 378 (noting that “overclassification is both 
inefficient and costly,” and stating that the authors’ empirical study on the impact 
“specific classification designations have on offender behavior” found that “inmate 
behavior may be influenced by the stigma associated with a particular correctional 
environment”). 
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and instead filed a new complaint charging him with misdemeanor 
assault.148  Rather than trusting the outcome of the court process, prisons are 
permitted to circumvent the judicial process altogether and impose 
consequences for dismissed or acquitted charges with little procedural 
protection.  Ethical prosecutors are thus precluded entirely from rectifying 
charging errors, and defense attorneys must worry about the import of 
charges raised and later dismissed, as the minimal process required to 
impose sexual offender classifications within prisons permits the 
consideration of charges that have been renounced by prosecutors, judges, 
and juries alike.  Greater procedural protections for members of the 
branded class and those like them would assist in resolving these concerns. 
All these issues could be settled, of course, by requiring that prisons base 
their classification decisions solely on elements of crimes for which inmates 
have been convicted.  Under such an approach, for example, only a person 
convicted of a sex offense could be classified and treated as a sexual 
offender.  As the likelihood of judicial adoption of this type of perspective is 
slim—the judicial reluctance to meddle in the daily affairs of correctional 
institutions is deep-rooted—we turn to the question of what process is 
sufficient to protect the liberty interests of inmates in the branded class, as 
well as other stigmatized prisoners. 
The requirements of due process are relative, calling for “such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”149  In Mathews v. 
Eldridge, the Supreme Court established three factors that courts must 
consider in evaluating the sufficiency of particular procedures: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government’s interest 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.150 
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge due process test to members of the 
branded class reveals that these inmates are entitled to far more, and more 
meaningful, process than they have been awarded thus far. 
The private interest that will be affected by the official action is 
significant, as it involves persons who have never been convicted of a specific 
crime being classified and treated as if they have been so convicted, with the 
attendant risks, derision, humiliation, and restrictions involved.  The risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used is 
also substantive, as that risk involves the subjection of an innocent person to 
 
148 See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003). 
149 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
150 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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the travails mentioned.  The probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and cross-
examination and burden of proof placed on the government, would be 
significant, as it would remove these classification procedures from the back 
room and thrust them into the light of the adversarial process.  Finally, the 
government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail, is de minimis when compared to the risks of 
subjecting wrongly accused persons to the multiple deprivations associated 
with, for example, sexual offender classification and treatment.  Courts must 
thus add to the Wolff standards the right to counsel, a neutral hearing body, 
the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, and a government-held 
burden of proof in cases where constitutionally significant stigma is 
present.151 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Serving a prison sentence is stigmatizing, as is being convicted of a 
crime, but the fact that inmates are demeaned in these ways should not 
deprive them of a liberty interest in avoiding further stigma.  The definition 
of “stigma” proposed here would add consistency to liberty interest 
determinations and expand procedural due process protections to 
stigmatized prisoners.  When a prison imposes a label on a prisoner that 
implies that he has committed a criminal offense or is mentally ill, and is 
unrelated to the elements of the crimes for which he was convicted, and 
carries a significant risk of adverse consequences to the prisoner, courts 
should find that the inmate has a liberty interest in avoiding the stigmatizing 
label and the conditions associated with it.  Providing procedural due 
process protections to prisoners who are thus stigmatized is a step towards 
ensuring that prisons classify and treat inmates for what they have done, not 
based on who the prison system imagines them to be. 
 
151 Meza v. Livingston is an example of a case where the court found that an inmate was enti-
tled to additional protections before the prison could label him as a sex offender.  In 
Meza, the Fifth Circuit held that if Mr. Meza were incarcerated, he would be entitled to 
the procedural due process protections of Wolff before he could be classified as a sex 
offender, but because he was on parole he was owed additional protections, namely:  (1) 
written notice that sex offender conditions may be required under mandatory 
supervision; (2) disclosure of evidence against him; (3) a hearing at which he could 
appear, present evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine, 
unless good cause was shown as to why this should not occur; (5) an impartial 
decisionmaker; (6) written statement of factfinder regarding evidence relied on and 
reasons that sex offender conditions were attached to his mandatory supervision.  Meza v. 
Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2010). 
